Is the ”Taiwanese Gambit” a solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis?

 Author: PhD Florin Gh. Ghețău

Kim Jong-un

 

We may surely say that the international agenda of 2017 has been heavily dominated by the North Korean nuclear issue. The installation of the Trump administration has aggravated a long-standing problem on the agenda of the White House presidents. The new American president believes that this problem can only be solved by showing the American military superiority or by threatening North Korea. But, as it has been seen, this approach does not work, and economic sanctions have long time ago been proven worthless. In view of all this, we should ask ourselves: Might the North Korean nuclear crisis be solved in the way the US wants?

Before speculating on the evolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, we should discuss a bit about the reasons that have produced it. The main purpose of a dictatorial regime is to maintain its power, despite any internal or external opposition. This is also the case of Kim Jong Un who should not be regarded as an eccentric character, or as an individual who should end up in the hands of psychiatrists, but as a totalitarian dictator who does everything in his power in order to prolong the life of his regime. His behavior may seem foolish to us, but he fits perfectly into the logic of the form of government represented by Kim Jong Un – the dictatorship. A dictatorial regime is based on force, and the Pyongyang dictator struggles on two fronts (against his own people and against the US and its allies) in order to strengthen his aura as the leader of an inexpugnable regime. Looking at the actions of the North Korean dictator from the perspective of the struggle for survival, we understand that he is not at all mad, but very rational, and that he pursues step by step the preservation of his authority over North Korea and that he is willing to do anything for attaining this vital objective.

            We have to understand very clearly the fact that Kim Jong Un is not planning to launch a nuclear attack. He will not be the first to attack because he has no interest in doing that. The North Korean leader knows that if he attacks first, this will lead to the end of his regime. It is beyond any doubt that the US has the necessary military power to rapidly and completely crush the North Korean army. This is obvious to anyone, but the less visible issue is this: How can you defeat North Korea without North Korea attacking South Korea, Japan or the US? If a single North Korean nuclear missile reaches any target from these three countries, it will be a much greater disaster than what happened in Hiroshima or Nagasaki in 1945. In fact, Kim Jong Un's goal is to show the US that, in the case of a preventive attack, it will lose much more than it will win, it would be a victory à la Pirus. Kim Jong Un does not imagine he could win a war against America, he just wants to prove that a war would be a useless enterprise.

That being said, let's try to find out what is the way out of the spiral of political-military escalations that existed between the US and North Korea. Because, as in the Cold War, tensions accumulate, and the risk of war is very high. But we have to point out, once again, that the communist state of the Korean peninsula does not want war, and its nuclear arsenal has been created to prevent a war it cannot win. The dynasty of Kim Jong Un has been drawing lessons from the history of the past decades. The fate of some dictators like Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi has demonstrated that their failure was due to lacking of solid security guarantees. This aspect was also understood by Iran, but Iran has proved incapable of resisting economic pressures and has signed a waiver agreement with its nuclear program. North Korea, on the other hand, can resist the economic sanctions without difficulty, because the North Korean regime does not show any concern about its own people, and economic sanctions only affect the people. No matter how severe the economic sanctions might be, these will not be able to convince Kim Jong Un to give up his nuclear arsenal.

On December 22, 2017, the UN Security Council adopted new economic sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Sadly, they will not even modify with a millimeter  the trajectory on which Kim Jong Un regime has placed itself . The sanctions primarily affect the North Korean people, and the Pyongyang leader and the clique around him do not intend to show any kind of compassion. The only thing that interests him is the salvation of the regime, and for this he is willing to do everything he is able to. On the other hand, smugglers from China and Russia will provide North Korea with the necessary materials to continue developing its ballistic program, and the authorities of the two states have the interest not to smother this smuggling.

China and Russia have no interest in supporting the collapse of North Korea. The two countries do not oppose the Security Council's decisions, in order not to be associated with a criminal regime by the international public opinion, but in fact the interests of Beijing and Moscow are far from the interests of the United States. The disappearance of North Korea would lead to the reunification of the peninsula to the advantage of South Korea. Of course, for decades, according to the example offered by Germany's reunification, unified Korea will have economic and social problems, but in the long run, along China's frontiers  there will prosper a strong state, which is still  intimidated enough  by the Chinese dragon to maintain close ties with the US. We have reason to believe, based again on the German model, that neither the American military bases in the peninsula will be withdrawn. So, no matter how disturbed China is by the turbulent North Korean leader, it is far more disturbed by the prospect of increasing US influence at its borders. President Trump's accusations of Xi Jinping, that the Chinese People's Republic does not do enough to put pressure on North Korea, ignore the fact that the two superpowers simply do not have common interests. It is illogical to expect Beijing to act against its own interests.

The second option would be military. Absolutely, the US, along with South Korea can attack Kim Jong Un’s regime. The victory is easy and predictable, but it would be an unnecessary victory, the most catastrophic victory in the history of humanity. The military option is feasible only to the extent that the American technological superiority would ensure that no North Korean nuclear missile reaches any target. But America cannot guarantee that. The US missile defense system needs four interceptors to guarantee the destruction of even a primitive North Korean missile. But the expensive US anti-missile system does not yet have many interceptors, and their effectiveness, as I have indicated, is not sufficient to justify a North Korean nuclear war. No one can be certain that a nuclear missile will not reach South Korea, Japan or the US. Over time, it is expected that the number and effectiveness of North Korean ballistic missiles will increase, which will diminish the prospects for a preventive attack on this state. Not to mention that it will produce more and more nuclear warheads. So the idea of ​​an attack on the Communist state of the Korean Peninsula is inappropriate and becomes less and less possible with the passage of time, despite President Trump's bellicose rhetoric.

A third option would be to offer North Korea strong security guarantees, and so strong that it would allow it to be deprived of its nuclear arsenal protection. Obviously, United States guarantees are useless because they have no value for Kim Jong Un. He knows very well that such guarantees cannot afford the survival of his regime. We consider it eloquent to think of the crisis launched in 2014 in Ukraine, to understand the way into which the North Korean leader thinking. Ukraine has inherited a nuclear arsenal from the defunct USSR. Ukraine gave up on it, through the Budapest Memorandum (December 5, 1994), in exchange for Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom guaranteeing its territorial integrity. In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and should we ask ourselves whether Moscow would have had the courage of such a gesture if Ukraine had retained, at least partially the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union? Of course not! As a consequence, it is very difficult to give Kim enough security guarantees to persuade him to give up his nuclear arsenal.

There would also be the option of some Chinese security guarantees, somewhat more credible than the American ones. Why not install Chinese military bases in North Korea, and the risks of an American attack would disappear. The solution is promising, especially that there is a still valid alliance treaty between North Korea and China. Moreover, there could be the variant of a form of Chinese control over North Korean nuclear weapons as a guarantee that they could not be used without Beijing's consent. But we do not believe in this solution either, for the simple reason that the North Korean regime would be dependent on China, it would really become a Chinese satellite, and Kim Jong Un's freedom of movement would be drastically reduced. He will not accept any variant that significantly reduces his absolute authority over his state. He understood very well that, in order to have a chance of survival, he must establish his own security only on his own strengths. Unfortunately, history has proven him to be right.

            From the above shown aspects, we notice that economic sanctions, a preventive attack, and the provision of solid security guarantees cannot solve the crisis in the Korean Peninsula. What makes us believe that there is no rapid resolution of this crisis and that this state should be treated as the Soviet Union was treated during the Cold War, using a mix of diplomacy, military force and economic sanctions that can stretches over many decades, perhaps even more. But it must be kept in mind that the Pyongyang regime may be even more dangerous than it is. It may become, over time, a source of nuclear weapons supply for similar regimes. Is it so hard to conceive that North Korea could sell nuclear weapons to Iran, Venezuela, Cuba or to states with certain regional ambitions, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia? Until now, the access to the nuclear weapons club has been achieved through the states’ own efforts, by developing costly and long-term indigenous nuclear programs. Would not it be much easier to buy nuclear weapons than to produce them? North Korea could make a decisive contribution to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is, in our view, the great North Korean threat, a state that needs money and can secure its position, causing even more problems for the US in its very hemisphere. Since the best defense is the attack, selling nuclear weapons to Havana or Caracas would create huge security problems for America, and world peace would be severely threatened. This requires a rapid and effective resolution of this crisis. But how could it be reached?

The solution to resolving this crisis lies in cooperation with China. Beijing can put pressure on North Korea in order to obtain concessions from its side. It may break the alliance treaty, stop any transfer of goods and raw materials to North Korea and put military pressure on this state and its northern border. In addition, given China's influence over the Kremlin, Russia can also be co-opted in this enterprise. On the other hand, China has resources and means to coagulate an internal opposition to Kim Jong Un, and can accept the reunification of the Korean peninsula in the way Washington wants. But why would China act this way?

The People's Republic of China considers Taiwan Island to be a rebellious province. China's reunification is a major goal for any Chinese president. Taiwan is a functioning democracy, and China a communist dictatorship with a capitalist economic system. The only chance for Taiwan not to fall under China's control is the USA. US military support is vital to the Taipei regime, as is the support  given to Pyongyang by  China. It is quite clear that the only way China can be persuaded to participate decisively at the conclusion of the North Korean nuclear crisis is the Taiwanese issue. It is the only card that could determine Xi Jinping to act on the peninsula of Korea the way the US wants. In other words, America must give up Taiwan's military and political support by encouraging China's reunification on the basis of the "one country – two systems" principle used in Hong Kong in 1997. The US must offer something palpable, something unrefusable, and that thing can only be Taiwan.

Gambit is a term used in chess to designate a move involving the sacrifice of a piece for gaining a decisive advantage. The "Taiwanese Gambit" is the only move that could quickly and definitively resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. If he wants such an outcome, the Trump administration has to play the "Taiwanese gambit" on Eurasia's grand chessboard, in the match where he is confronting Kim Jong Un. Otherwise, the US has to get prepared for a new Cold War against a tiny and insignificant republic that does not shy away from anything in order to survive. We do not say that such a gambit should indeed be played, but that it is the only solution through which the crisis can be extinguished quickly and completely. The solution is at hand, but America has to decide whether the price it has to pay is acceptable. This crisis can only end with a realpolitik approach because US military supremacy is not enough, economic sanctions are not efficient, and Russia and China will not cooperate with the United States for the sake of world peace and stability alone. The US opposes Pyongyang because it feels threatened. America is acting to protect its own interests, and so does China, and the more obvious this will be, the higher the chances that this crisis will end up.